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This paper assesses the cost effectiveness of wind energy policy options by using a costebeneﬁt analysis
approach. In comparison with other studies, the main contribution of this paper is the use of real
ﬁnancial and operational information of 318 wind projects in Spain between 2006 and 2013. The projects
represent 83% of total new wind capacity additions in Spain during the 2006e2013 period. Under real
market conditions, it is found that the most cost effective option for promoting wind energy develop-
ment from the government perspective is to use an investment credit policy given the capital intensive
nature of wind technology. The analysis shows that an investment credit yields similar results as other
policy options like feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums, but at a cheaper cost and with less risk to the
taxpayers or electricity consumers because costs do not ﬂuctuate with electricity market prices.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The aim of this research is to provide a better understanding of
the relationship between renewable technologies and the cheapest
ﬁnancing method from the perspective society (taxpayers or rate-
payers), using real data from 318 Spanish onshore wind projects.
We deliberately focus on the direct cost of the policy, while other
potential indirect beneﬁts or costs are not considered.
Countries around the world are promoting the adoption of
renewable energy technologies as a means of enhancing energy
security, environmental sustainability, national industries and
green jobs among others [1]. However, currently some govern-
ments are reevaluating renewable energy’s policy support [2]. This
is the case for some European countries. For example, in Spain
regulators implemented a feed-in tariff as themain form of subsidy,
which succeeded in the signiﬁcant deployment of renewable
technologies [3]. However, concerns about policy costs grew as
more wind was deployed and economies, such as Spain, slowed.
Spain was emblematic of the tension between renewable energy
deployment, costs, and the risk to ratepayers associated with
market price volatility. In this context, the European Commissioniyadh, 11672, Saudi Arabia.
an), Jorge.Blazquez@kapsarc.
ezamuddin).
r Ltd. This is an open access article[4] suggests that, if public support is not carefully designed, it can
distort the operation of the electricity markets and lead to higher
costs for households and businesses. It is not only the capacity of
renewables deployed that matters, but it is also the cost. Spain is an
ideal case study, particularly with respect to wind energy, for
looking at historic projects and assessing the cost of the policies.
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy [5], as of
2013, Spain ranked fourth in wind installed capacity after China,
USA and Germany. Although Spain’s energy policy successfully
deployed a large quantity of wind energy, it came at a cost which
led to policy changes from 2006 to 2013. (see Appendix I for a
detailed description of shifts in renewable energy policy along the
timeframe). In this context, as Menanteau et al. [6] indicate, one of
the problems in designing public interventions is the lack of
granular cost information available for policymakers. Financial in-
centives to promote renewable technology can become too small or
too large when there is a lack of accurate cost information.
In contrast to other studies, this study uses real wind project
data, addressing granularity issues, to compare feed-in tariffs and
other subsidy types, including feed-in premium or production tax
credit, and investment credit in order to understand which option
is most cost effective. The paper uses data from 318 onshore wind
projects built in Spain from 2006 to 2013, totaling 10,732 MW. The
use of real project data reveals valuable insights about the rela-
tionship between ﬁnancial conditions and capacity factor that areunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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relevant since they have an impact on the cost of the projects and
the cost of the policy. Although this paper does not focus on
ﬁnancial instruments for promoting renewable technology, it does
not imply that ﬁnancial conditions are not as important as public
policies for the deployment of new technologies, as Masini and
Menichetti [7] point out.
This study shows that investment credits are the most
economical way of promoting renewable energy, but they lead to
the lowest return on capital employed for private investors. On the
contrary, feed-in tariffs provide a guaranteed revenue to investors
but the total cost of the policy is the highest for the ratepayers. We
want to highlight that this is not a study on Spanish renewable
policy. This study uses information of Spanish onshore wind data to
compare different policies in terms of support, cost and deploy-
ment of renewable energy in an accurate way.
In our opinion, this is a very relevant ﬁnding. Nowadays, feed-in
tariffs are being abandoned in Europe in favor of new models of
support. There is a growing consensus which supports that feed-in
tariffs have been an expensive tool for promoting renewable en-
ergy, as for example Schmalensee points out [8].
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the sce-
nario development andmethodology. The results from the scenario
development are represented in Section 3 and a discussion of the
policies is present in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Scenario development & methodology
This paper considers three subsidy types and a no-policy sce-
nario: feed-in tariffs (FIT), production tax credits or feed-in pre-
miums (FIP), and investment credits (IC). For the purpose of
analysis, the production tax credits and feed-in premiums are
treated equally since they are both an output subsidy on a euro per
MWh basis.
2.1. Policy instruments
The FIT used in this analysis is a guaranteed minimum ﬁxed
price (in real terms) for the electricity produced over the life of
the wind projects. If the market price is greater than the FIT, then
the owner of the wind facility receives the market price. If the
price of electricity is low, investors receive the FIT price. This
type of policy generates an asymmetric, though appetizing, risk
for investors [9] On the other hand, the burden for electricity
ratepayers is variable and ultimately depends on dynamics of
electricity market prices. This kind of FIT has been partially in
effect in Spain during the period 2006e2013, but there are other
possible designs for FIT. The National Renewable Energy Labo-
ratory [10] provides a detailed description of alternative FITs. The
FIP is a ﬁxed amount that is added to the market price. This
policy instrument was used in Spain to promote renewable
technology, but in very limited scale. Finally, An IC is a percent-
age discount on the initial investment that is given to reduce the
costs of a technology, i.e., a direct subsidy. For example, a 10% IC
for a V1 million wind project would result in V900,000 in costs
for the developer, while the government shoulders the remaining
V100,000. An IC can also be applied on a ﬁxed euro per MW basis
as a lump sum. Intuitively, the ﬁxed reduction IC not only makes
projects cheaper but tends to reduce the ﬁnancial incentive for
lower cost projects relative to costlier projects that the per-
centage IC discount provides. This type of lump sum subsidy does
not beneﬁt expensive projects as all projects, regardless their
investment cost, receive the same amount of ﬁnancial support.
Spain did not implement this policy instrument to promote
renewable energy.2.2. Data
A number of data sources were used. Bloomberg New Energy
Finance (BNEF) is the primary source of information (leverage, ca-
pacity factor, location, CAPEX, and number of projects) regarding
the wind projects characteristics [11]. Wholesale prices, from both
the Iberian Market Operator [12] and the Comision Nacional de Los
Mercados y La Competencia (the Spanish Regulatory Body) [13],
were used to compare the costs of policies relative to the market.
Additionally, the Spanish Regulatory Body reports information on
electricity produced fromwind and ﬁnancial support given towind.
Interest rates regarding long-term bank loans come from the Bank
of Spain [14].
The cost of equity was assumed as 8% as assumed by BNEF [15],
and the government discount rate was assumed to be a constant
3.7% as suggested by Martin-Moreno [16]. Both costs are in real
terms for the period of analysis in order to have a uniﬁed approach
to compare values. The operating life of all projects is 20 years as it
is the accepted timeframe for renewable projects.
The capacity factors of the wind projects are estimated based on
project-level BNEF and Spanish Regulatory Body information.
Regarding the ﬁnancial conditions, we assume that all debt is
structured as amortized loans in which there are equal payments
over the maturity of the loan. All costs for projects in the analysis,
which cover a period of 8 years, have been translated to constant
Euros, with 2014 being the base year.
The dataset includes ﬁnancial and operational information of
318 onshore wind projects implemented in Spain from 2006 to
2013. Projects included in the dataset have a minimum installed
capacity of 15 megawatts (MW). The projects represent 10,732 MW
of installed capacity, and 83% of the 12,885MW installed during the
2006e2013 period, according to BP Statistical Review of World
Energy 2014 [5]. In order to assess the cost of each project, we used
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as the real discount
rate. The WACC of each individual project is the weighted average
between the cost of the equity, that we assume to be 8%, and the
cost of debt, which changes depending on the year each project is
commissioned. The average WACC of projects in the analysis is 6%.
Table 1 shows that the number of wind projects commissioned
per year declined from 58 to 5 projects from 2006 to 2013. The
amount of new capacity additions declined from 1896 MWe
190MWper year. This was due to the government’s shift in support
for wind which is indicated in the Appendix.
The wholesale electricity market in Spain is liberalized. The
market price in Spain is set in a day-ahead market and it depends
on the expected supply and demand along the day. In addition,
there is a real-timemarket to sell and buy electricity during the day,
allowing ﬁne-tuning of prices and quantities as it is common in
European markets.
2.3. Methodology
A costebeneﬁt analysis (CBA) was conducted to compare the
total discounted revenue and the total discounted cost for each of
the 318 projects during their economic life. The analysis takes the
perspective of private investors, then calculates the incremental
cost of policies to taxpayers and/or electricity customers.
The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is representative of the
“cost” metric of the CBA. It illustrates the stream of equal payments
normalized over expected energy production. The levelized avoi-
ded cost of electricity (LACE) represents the “revenues” metric in
the CBA. It is the estimate of the revenues available to a given
resource normalized over the expected energy production period.
Calculations for both LCOE and LACE are adapted from Namovicz
[17] and are the standard approach in the literature. The difference
Table 1
Summary of key data.
Year Number of projects Total installed (MW) Investment (EUR thousand) Debt-level Capacity factor
2006 58 1896 V 1263 50.8% 26.7%
2007 64 2145 V 1311 43.5% 23.9%
2008 69 2166 V 1353 49.0% 24.8%
2009 54 2004 V 1452 42.0% 22.7%
2010 29 937 V 1587 48.1% 25.7%
2011 26 986 V 1365 46.7% 21.7%
2012 13 408 V 1260 59.4% 23.2%
2013 5 190 V 1230 45.6% 19.2%
Total 318 10,732
Average V 1361 47.1% 24.3%
Minimum V 1214 10% 11%
Maximum V 1600 85% 46%
Source: Author’s calculations based on BNEF and Bank of Spain data.
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incremental annual cost to the government (taxpayers) in order to
breakeven. The incremental cost of each subsidy to the government
was calculated assuming a government discount rate of 3.7%.
Finally, we assume that investors are risk neutral. This assumption
is, obviously, a simpliﬁcation, but we do not have data on this
variable.
In our methodological approach we are not paying attention to
the relationship between deployment of renewable technology and
price of electricity. The deployment of renewable energy tends to
decrease the price of electricity and tends to increase its volatility as
Browne et al. (2015) [18], Clo et al. (2015) [19], Würzburg et al.
(2013) [20] and Paraschiv et al. (2014) [21] point out. We conduct a
partial equilibrium analysis that compares the cost of policy,
assuming that there is no change in the rest of the variables of the
market. Assessing the impact of the deployment of renewables on
prices and consumer’s welfare requires a general equilibrium
analysis and that is not within the scope this study.
3. Results
3.1. Relationships & wind supply curve
Novel relationships for Spanish onshore wind projects were
uncovered during analysis of the dataset. One of which is the
relationship between the capacity factor and debt-level of projects.Fig. 1. Capacity factAs indicated in Fig. 1, the ﬁnancial structure of a project depends on
the capacity factor, which is the utilization rate of a plant. There is a
clear positive correlation between capacity factor and debt
leverage, higher quality projects (those with higher capacity fac-
tors) are ﬁnanced with higher levels of debt (high leverage).
Whereas lower quality projects (those with lower capacity factors)
have more equity ﬁnancing (lower leverage). A possible explana-
tion is that projects with lower capacity factor will receive less
income along the life of the project, making these projects less
attractive for bank ﬁnancing. It is important to highlight that the
cost of equity is higher than the cost of debt (see Table 1). As a
result, higher capacity factor projects have lower WACC. This is a
relevant ﬁnding, since the bulk of previous studies consider the
WACC constant regardless the capacity factor. Wiser and Steven
[22] realized that the private cost of production of electricity for
these technologies are highly sensitive to ﬁnancial conditions.
Capacity factor is a key determinant of a project’s LCOE. Since
the variable costs of wind energy projects are minor, the more a
facility operates, the lower its per unit cost. Fig. 2 plots the LCOE
and its relationship with the capacity factor of each project.
Although analysts and decision makers typically use a single
number when representing a technology’s LCOE, according to
actual data LCOE and capacity factor can vary substantially by
project. The bulk of projects in our dataset have a capacity factor
between 15%e29% and a LCOE between V59/MWh e V99/MWh.
Finally, using the LCOE for each wind project in theor & leverage.
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Fig. 2. Capacity factor & LCOE.
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projects from least to most expensive. Fig. 3 presents the wind
supply curve with each project’s LCOE and the cumulative capacity
(MW). Fig. 3 is not a conventional supply curve, since it does not
link production of electricity and marginal costs of production.
Rather, the curve represents the long-run cost of constructing and
operating the various projects over their 20-year useful lives. The
average LCOE for Spanish commissioned wind projects in our
dataset is V84/MWh, while the median is V78/MWh. This supply
curve for onshore wind commissioned projects in Spain is an
original result and it is the cornerstone for the rest of this analysis.
In this section we used the data available to construct a curve
that links LCOE and installed capacity deployed, in an innovative
approach. This curve will allow us to evaluate the cost of different
projects in future sections.
3.2. Scenario analysis
3.2.1. No policy support scenario
To begin examining the cost competitiveness of the wind pro-
jects, we evaluated their LCOE against potential revenues in a
baseline “no-subsidy” market scenario. The real price of electricity
in this scenario is a constant V48.6/MWh over the 20-year study
period. Electricity prices are volatile from hour to hour, and dailyFig. 3. Wind suaverage prices can ﬂuctuate widely. Between 2006 and 2014, the
real daily price of electricity ranged from aminimum ofV0/MWh to
over V106/MWh. The average daily price over this period was
V48.6/MWh with a standard deviation of V15.3/MWh. Around 76%
of the daily price observations are within the price interval V33.4/
MWh e V63.9/MWh (average ± one standard deviation). This data
is from the Iberian operator for electricity markets. The timeframe
for prices (2006e2014) is different than for the database
(2006e2013). However, it is not an inconsistent decision. All pro-
jects and cost of this study are evaluated at constant euros of 2014.
Using the baseline market scenario as a proxy for unit revenues
allows for a clearer picture of the competitive situation of wind
technology in Spain. If we compare the LCOE of the projects (project
wind supply curve) with their potential levelized revenues, we ﬁnd
that only 200 MW of 10,732 MW have a positive net present value
(NPV). In other words, only 1.9% of the total installed capacity is
potentially economic under market conditions. As a result, the
cumulative NPV of the projects in Spain is found to be negative
V7.80 billion. The average NPV scaled per installed capacity is
negative V0.73 million/MW.
Ultimately, the NPV of each individual project depends on the
ﬁnal price of electricity. As prices increase, the NPV of the projects
improve. In particular, if the real price of electricity achieves V78/
MWh, the cumulative NPV of the 318 projects would be zero.pply curve.
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prices observed in the period considered are greater than V78.3.2.2. Feed-in tariff
This analysis uses a FIT level in real terms of V83/MWh. The FIT
level was derived from the reports by the Spanish Regulatory Body
for the period 2009e2014.
In the FIT scenario, 6120 MW of installed capacity are economic
with a positive NPV. The cumulative NPV of the projects is V1.3
billion. These results are constant under a market price ofV0/MWh
- V83/MWh because the wind projects receive the same revenue
from the FIT at those price levels. As electricity prices increase
beyondV83/MWh, the NPV and amount of economic wind capacity
increases.
On the contrary, the discounted cost of the policy is a mirror
image the NPV for investors. The incremental cost of the policy is
greatest if the market price is V0 and decreases as prices increase.
The incremental cost of the policy is equal toV0 if the market price
exceedsV83/MWh. In the baseline market scenario ofV48.6/MWh,
the incremental cost to ratepayers of the FIT is V11 billion (V1.0
million/MW).
Our analysis indicates that a FIT policy option yields risk on the
government and ratepayers but is stable for investors because of
the revenue certainty afforded by the policy in a vast majority of the
scenarios, 98.1% of the prices observed were below V83/MWh.
The remainder of our policy scenarios use the 6120 MW of cu-
mulative economic capacity from the FIT scenario as a benchmark
to allow for equal comparisons of different policy subsidies. This
capacity ﬁgure acts as the policy target. By setting the benchmark
as cumulative capacity we can clearly understand the cost on the
taxpayers and ratepayers and the revenue to the investor in
achieving the desired MWs.3.2.3. Feed-in premium (FIP)
Under a FIP we have selected V35/MWh as a baseline FIP sub-
sidy amount. This is because aV35/MWh subsidy on top of aV48.6/
MWh baseline market price yields equivalent results in terms of
achieving the benchmark 6120 MW of economic projects.
Unlike FITs, a FIP policy option shifts the cost risks from the
government/taxpayer to the investor. In this case, the cost of the
policy to the taxpayer does not change, sitting at V11 billion (V1.0
million/MW), regardless of the price. On the other hand, revenue
and thus NPV for investors ﬂuctuates with prevailingmarket prices.
The NPV of the projects increases with prices. Under this policy
scheme, investors face potential upside and downside risk. This is
why if investors are risk averse, a FIP is less attractive than a FIT.
Dinica [23] points out that risk is as important as expected yield in
order to support renewable technology.
A FIT of V83/MWh and a FIP of V35/MWh produce exactly the
same results if the market price is V48.6/MWh. However, the
uncertainties regarding the cost for policymakers and the beneﬁts
for investors are different under both policies. The FIP shifts risks
toward investors and so an increase in their WACC can be ex-
pected. Higher volatility of income implies that investors will seek
higher yields and lenders will require higher interest rates.
However, there is no data to assess the impacts at the level of
individual projects.
To examine what might be the impact of such an increase, we
applied a uniform increase of 1% to the WACC. This increases the
average LCOE of Spanish wind projects by V5/MW. Under the new
conditions, the baseline subsidy required to achieve the target
(6,120 MW) increases toV40/MWh, resulting in a 15% (V1.7 billion)
increase in policy costs. In the worst case, increasing the WACC by
2% results in an additional 31% (V3.5 billion) cost for the policy.3.2.4. Investment credit
An IC of 53% is required to achieve the benchmark 6120 MW of
economic projects. The cost of this policy V8.4 billion (V0.80
million/MW). This means that, despite being a steep discount, an IC
can achieve the same benchmark level of economic wind capacity
at a cheaper cost than a FIT and FIP. This policy does not entail any
additional risk from the policy side as the cost of the policy is
known from the onset and is not affected by electricity market
volatility.
Despite being cheaper than FIT and FIP, an IC can be a less
attractive option for policymakers than FIT and FIP. The reason for
that is the ICs method of payment, which is an upfront payment, is
paid directly via public spending. In addition, ICs can be risky for
investors because the amount of return is dictated by electricity
prices and can ﬂuctuate with these changes. Similar to the FIP, we
conducted a sensitivity analysis increasing the WACC. A 1% in-
crease, across the board results in a need for a higher credit (57
percent). Increasing the cost of the policy by 7% (V0.6 billion). An
increase of 2% results in the cost of the policy increasing by 12% (V1
billion).
An IC results in a downward shift of the wind supply curve.
However, this shift is not parallel. Instead there is a general ﬂat-
tening of the curve, because higher cost projects (in V/MW terms)
and those with lower capacity factors, and thus higher WACC,
experience greater LCOE reductions than cheaper projects with
lower WACC. This scheme tends to provide a greater incentive for
costlier projects, normally those with lower capacity factors. A way
to correct for this unintended result, is by giving a ﬁxed sum in-
vestment credit rather than a percent reduction. It was found that a
lump sum of V792,000/MW of installed capacity generates the
benchmark amount of cumulative capacity, 6120 MW. The ﬁxed IC
is a cheaper policy than a percent-reduction IC by V0.94 billion (an
11% reduction).
4. Discussion: comparison of policies
Average electricity market prices can vary in the future and,
then, we conducted an analysis for prices between V0/MWh and
V100/MWh. Four critical prices were selected in order to evaluate
the cost of the policies. Table 2 reﬂects the discounted cost of the
policies in the four market price scenarios. For amarket price below
V48/MWh the FIT is the most expensive policy. Between V48 e
V56/MWh, the FIP is the most expensive subsidy for the govern-
ment. The IC is cost effective for prices below V56/MWh. If the
market price, in real terms, is consistently aboveV56/MW the FIT is
the most economic subsidy. If the price is greater than V83/MWh,
the cost of the FIT is zero.
A key element to understanding why an investment credit is
cheaper than a feed-in tariff or a feed-in premium is to look at the
discount rate of future payments. Society (taxpayer, ratepayers, or
government) has a lower discount rate than private investors.
In general terms, the FIT is the most expensive policy given the
Spanish market conditions. Schmalensee [8] suggests that, despite
its popularity around the world, “[FIT] is almost certain not to
minimize the cost of achieving program’s goals” (see pg. 2 of
document [8]). According to Schmalensee’s analysis, a mandate,
such as the Renewable Portfolio Standards in the U.S., is cheaper
than a FIT under market conditions.
For policymakers an IC is the most appealing policy option,
because it represents the minimum ﬁnancial burden at which the
policy targets are achieved at market conditions. Only if policy-
makers expect a market price that is systematically above V56/
MWh, they would then prefer a FIT policy option. This scenario
seems unlikely given the prices over the period 2006e2014 and the
fact that wind tends to operate in off-peak periods.
Table 2
Cost of policies (EUR billion).
Price (V/MWh) Percentile of scenario Price within 2006e2014 observation (%)a Policy option
FIT (V83/MW) FIP (V35/MW) IC (53%)
0 99.9% 26.1 11.0 8.4
48 50.5% 11.0 11.0 8.4
56 25.8% 8.4 11.0 8.4
83 1.9% 0.0 11.0 8.4
100 0.2% 0.0 11.0 8.4
The sample covers 318 Spanish wind projects, representing 10,732 MW.
a Instances when observed 2006e2014 exceed reference prices in column 1.
Source: Author’s calculations based on BNEF data.
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more attractive from a societal perspective, it has the disadvantage
of having to be paid up front using public ﬁnances. It could be hard
to implement from a political point of view. On the contrary, the FIT
and FIP are paid normally by the electricity consumers over the life
of the project, making them attractive for policymakers.
Table 3 depicts the NPV of the total projects for the different
policy scenarios (including a “no-subsidy scenario) and market
conditions from an investor’s perspective. For investors, a FIT is the
most appealing policy option for market prices below V48/MWh.
For prices above V48/MWh, a FIP would be the preferred policy by
investors.
Analysis conducted afﬁrms that investors would prefer a FIT
because of the constant positive return even in low market price
scenarios. Investors that expect prices of electricity to be system-
atically over V48/MWh would prefer a FIP given the higher return
on investment. In this analysis, IC would not be supported by in-
vestors under any price condition.
The analysis looks at policy options individually. It does not take
into consideration a combination of policies. A case could be made
that combining policy options yields more economic results for
society or more ﬁnancially attractive results for investors, as Mir-
Artigues and del Río [24] suggest.
5. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the cost of different policy options for
promoting wind energy using a dataset of 318 real Spanish onshore
wind projects. The projects represent 10,732 MW of installed ca-
pacity, and 83% of total installed during the period 2006e2013. This
study addresses the granularity issues that are omitted in a vast
majority of renewable energy studies. The dataset reveals some
interesting insights regarding the relationship between ﬁnancial
conditions and capacity factor that normally are omitted in theo-
retical approaches. In particular, projects with higher capacity
factor tend to be ﬁnanced more through debt than equity, and thus
have lower average costs of capital.
Since renewable technologies are capital intensive [25], theTable 3
Cumulative NPV (EUR billion).
Price (V/MWh) Percentile of scenario price within 2006e2014 observation (%)a
0 99.9%
48 50.5%
56 25.8%
83 1.9%
100 0.2%
The sample covers 318 Spanish wind projects, representing 10,732 MW.
a Instances when observed 2006e2014 exceed reference prices in column 1.
Source: Author’s calculations based on BNEF data.most cost effective option for society to promote wind technology,
without risking total costs ﬂuctuating with electricity prices, is to
use an investment credit policy (subsidy to investment). This is
because an investment credit cuts the initial cost of developing a
project. The policy yields the same results as other policy options
including feed-in tariffs and feed-in premium or production tax
credits, but at a cheaper cost in plausible electricity price scenarios.
However and from the point of view of private investors, a feed-in
tariff is the preferred policy option. Investors obtain higher proﬁts
under this policy and the volatility associated with market prices
are minimized.
Despite the fact that the investment credit appears more
attractive from a societal perspective, it has the disadvantage of
having to be paid up front using public ﬁnances. On the contrary,
the FIT and FIP are paid normally by the electricity consumers over
the life of the project. This can explain why these policy in-
struments have been widely used in many countries.
To sum up, given market conditions in Spain the most cost
effective policy option for policymakers comes in the form of an
investment credit because of the capital structure of renewable
technologies. However, private investors prefer feed-in tariff
because they maximize the return on their investments.
Appendix. A review of renewable energy policy in Spain,
2006e2013
Spanish power generation from wind represented 20% of total
electricity generation in 2013, ranking third in the world after
Denmark (32%) and Portugal (22%). At the beginning of the eco-
nomic crisis in 2008, ﬁnancial support for wind amounted to V1.2
billion. By 2013, the level of support doubled to V2.4 billion ac-
cording to the Spanish Regulatory Body. The increase in subsidies in
a fragile economy led a change in the Spanish government’s
renewable energy outlook. A shift towards a less favorable legal
framework was especially clear since 2010. As a result of this
change in the regulatory environment, wind installed capacity
almost stagnated in 2013.
Key regulatory policy changes in the period 2006e2013 include:Policy Option Market “no subsidy”
FIT (V83/MW) FIP (V35/MW) IC (53%)
1.3 11.2 11.9 20.3
1.3 1.3 0.6 7.8
1.3 3.4 2.7 5.7
1.3 10.4 9.8 1.3
5.7 14.9 14.2 5.7
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new Decree established a system of feed-in tariff and feed-in
premium, but with a lower level of public support than the
previous Royal Decree 436/2004. (See Asociacion Empresarial
Eolica e Association of Spanish Wind Companies e (2007) [26]
and IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and Measures database [27]).
 Royal Decree 6/2009. Established that future renewable energy
power projects must be pre-registered before they can be
eligible to receive public support. (See Asociacion Empresarial
Eolica (2010) [28] and IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and Measures
database [27]).
 Royal Decree 1614/2010. A maximum ﬁnancial support was
established for wind generators, in particular electricity pro-
duction. Wind generators that exceeded the limit were not
entitled to ﬁnancial support. (See Asociacion Empresarial Eolica
(2011 and 2012) [29] [30] and IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and
Measures database [27]).
 Royal Decree Law 1/2012. New renewable facilities that are
developed do receive ﬁnancial support. (See Asociacion
Empresarial Eolica (2013) [31] and IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and
Measures database [27]).
 Royal Decree Law 15/2012. Imposed a 7% tax on electricity
generation, including renewables sources. (See Asociacion
Empresarial Eolica (2013) [31] and IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and
Measures database [27]).
 Royal Decree Law 2/2013. The removal of feed-in premium from
the incentive options for wind power generators. This is a
retroactive law as all facilities, either old or new, were impacted.
(See Asociacion Empresarial Eolica. (2014) [32]).
 Royal Decree Law 9/2013. The feed-in tariff system is replaced by
an investment incentive. This new incentive was designed to
guarantee a return on investment similar to that of a 10-year
sovereign Spanish bond plus 300 basis points. This is a retro-
active law that affects all renewable energy plants. (See Aso-
ciacion Empresarial Eolica (2014) [32] and IEA/IRENA Joint
Policies and Measures database).
The evolution of the regulation on wind energy explains the
stagnation of Spanish wind projects in 2013. It seems that the
economic recession changed the perception of the Spanish Gov-
ernment on renewable energy and currently it was less likely to
favor wind projects.
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